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Abstract The weight of the housing tenancy market in Spain is very low. It is
frequently argued that an ineffective judicial system, implying a cumbersome pro-
cedure to evict a non-paying tenant or simply requiring a long period to execute a
decision, may be an important determinant of the tenancy market’s weakness, as it
constrains the effective supply by reducing the profitability of landlords. This research
studies this effect econometrically using a panel data approach and exploring differ-
ences in judicial efficacy among the Spanish provinces. After controlling for several
other factors, this study concludes that the degree of inefficacy of the judicial system
has a positive impact on the property share among provinces in Spain.
Keywords Judicial efficacy · Property market · Tenancy market ·
Contract enforcement
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1 Introduction
Since the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) the weight of the housing property market
has persistently increased in Spain (in contrast to developments in the rental mar-
ket). Although the official statistical information available is very scarce, the census
database reveals that the proportion rose from 63.4 to 82.2% between 1970 and 2001.
Moreover, according to the estimations of the SpanishMinistry of Housing (2008), the
average property rate rose by a further 2.1 percentage points in the period 2001–2007.
Several factors may have affected the evolution of the property share in Spain
over the last decades. These factors include the fall in interest rates (Blanco and
Restoy 2007), especially after 1995; liberalization of the banking sector since 1980
(Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas 2004; Iacoviello and Minetti 2003), more stringent
tenancy laws having been adopted following World War II (Mora-Sanguinetti 2011),
and a fiscal regime which favors buying over renting (López García 1996; García-
Vaquero and Martínez 2005).
Several studies have pointed out that the factors mentioned above are not exclusive
to Spain and that the increase in the property rate can be found in several other mar-
kets of the European Union as well as in the United States (Louvot-Runavot 2001).
Nevertheless, the relative weakness of the tenancy market as compared to the property
market in Spain is somewhat exceptional. This situation is generally regarded as unde-
sirable for several economic reasons. The most important one is perhaps that a weak
tenancy market is linked to lower mobility of individuals and workers (Maclennan
et al. 1998; Barceló 2006) which tends to increase the unemployment rate (Layard
et al. 1991) and to reduce the economy’s efficiency (Hardman and Ioannides 1999).
More recently, Arce and López-Salido (2007) have emphasized that a well-developed
housing rental sector can be a crucial device to avoid housing price bubbles and the
excessive concentration of resources in the building sector.
Despite these problems, and the imbalances entailed thereby, especially during the
recent housing boom in Spain, the Spanish authorities have only paid attention to them
recently. One such example is personal income tax deduction (IRPF) for the purchase
of a primary residence. This measure has been maintained by all national Govern-
ments (irrespective of political orientation) for public choice reasons, despite its effect
being to favor buying over renting (as mentioned above), its undesirable redistributive
effects (Sanz 2000; Bilbao Terol et al. 2006) or its effects in prices (López García
2004). Only very recently it has been proposed its abrogation (under the 2011 Budget
Law).1
Some time earlier, in 2009, the Government passed a Law2 introducing new reg-
ulatory measures with the objective to protect the owners of rented dwellings. These
reforms were intended to improve the functioning of the tenancy market, and thus, to
reduce the weight of the property market. Those measures included, on the one hand,
reform of the Spanish “Civil Procedural Law” (CPL)3 in order to expedite evictions
1 Law 39/2010 of 23 December 2010 (de presupuestos generales del Estado para el año 2011).
2 Law 19/2009 of 23 November 2009 (de medidas de fomento y agilización procesal del alquiler y de la
eficiencia energética de los edificios).
3 Law 1/2000, of 7 January 2000 (de enjuiciamiento civil).
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and to facilitate the collection of rents by property owners (see further discussions in
Sect. 2) and, on the other hand, reform of the Spanish Tenancy Law4 giving the owner
more legal grounds to reduce the term of the tenancy contract. The latter reform was
quite limited in scope and, as with all other substantive rules of the Spanish Tenancy
Law, does not form part of this study as it is not subject to any regional variation.
Underlying those latter measures is the idea that both a slow judicial system (imply-
ing a cumbersome procedure to evict a non-paying tenant or simply a lengthy period
to execute a decision) and unduly onerous rules governing tenancy contracts (such
as rules limiting the landlord’s ability to recover the flat for his own use) have been
detrimental to the tenancy market as they have reduced the effective supply and may
have contributed to lowering the share of rented dwellings.
A theoretical explanation of how judicial inefficacy may affect the flow of demand
and supply of housing is provided later in this paper. In any case it is important to
emphasize at the outset that the decision to rent a house on themarket (or part thereof as
is assumed below) involves transaction costs that do not exist (or at least are different)
in the market for home ownership.
In other words, the renting of a home implies a sustained relationship in time with
the figure of the tenant, which does not exist in the opposite case. That relationship
is linked to the functioning of the judicial system in the sense that, in the presence
of an ineffective judicial system (and therefore, under weakly controlled contractual
arrangements), some tenants may default on their contractual obligations (such as
paying the rent or taking care of the property). Those circumstances imply a reduction
in the landlord’s profits. The flow of benefits provided by rental housing thus depends
on the correct application in time of the rental contracts. This need not occur in the
case of complete ownership of a dwelling.
In addition to the judicial system, there are other control mechanisms in the market
for home ownership (the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper) such as
the property registry. An analysis of the role of property registration and other forms of
property enforcement may be consulted in Arruñada (2003). In any case, as discussed
below, it is possible to control by various inefficiencies that may exist in the mortgage
lending market through alternative judicial system measures (discussed below).
In summary, in this context, a proportion of potential landlords may disappear from
the market in the event of weak enforcement being provided by the judicial system.
This would imply an increase in the rate of property in the economy.5
That is the general result found on an international basis by some papers in the
economic literature, for instance Casas-Arce and Saiz (2010). Those authors used the
measure of judicial formalism (as a proxy of inefficacy) of Djankov et al. (2003) to
explain the decision between owning and renting in a set of countries and found that
more formalismmay be expected to reduce the weight of the tenancy market. Djankov
et al. (2003) proposed a measure of formalism of the judicial system when evicting a
non-paying tenant. They concluded that higher formalism is related to more difficult
4 Law 29/1994, of 24 November 1994 (de arrendamientos urbanos).
5 A discussion of how the judicial system works when dealing with tenancy conflicts is included below in
Sect. 2.
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evictions and higher unpredictability of the procedures.6 This paper specifically aims
to analyze the impact of an ineffective judicial system in Spain on the housing tenure
outcomes by exploiting the cross-province variation existing in the weight of the house
property market in Spain and in the performance of the judicial system. Landlords are
supposed to exit the tenancy market when they face an environment in which it is
difficult to enforce their tenancy contracts. Thus, this paper aims to assess to what
extent the efficacy functioning of the judicial system explains the varying weights of
the property market in the Spanish provinces once other concurrent factors are taken
into account.
In order to do that, I have constructed an index of judicial efficacy for each prov-
ince of Spain based on official judicial data.7 Then, its impact in the property share
is estimated after controlling for a set of other relevant economic and demographic
factors.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a descriptive analysis
of the cross province variation of the property rate in Spain and constructs the judi-
cial efficacy measure used in the main estimations. Section 3 explores the empirical
literature on the topic and provides a theoretical justification for the hypothesis tested
in this paper. Section 4 presents the estimations using panel data techniques. Finally,
Sect. 5 presents the findings of this study. Appendix A presents alternative estimations
when other judicial efficacy measures are taken into account.
2 Measuring judicial efficacy and the property rate in the Spanish economy
An owner who wants to collect an unpaid rent or evict a tenant for any reason (non-
payment of rent, vandalism of property) in Spain has to use the procedures established
by the CPL (2000).8 The CPL (2000) is the basic procedural regulation of the judicial
system. It establishes the rules of access to the court system, the formal procedures that
the parties must observe, the role of the judge, the rules governing the admission and
use of evidence, the control exercised by superior courts and all related issues. There-
fore that Law is a main determinant of the “aggregated” slow (or fast) performance of
the judicial system in Spain (Mora-Sanguinetti 2010). Although it is a national Law,
its application differs among the Spanish provinces. A rational explanation for that is
that the workload of the judges may differ among the provinces. This may be partially
implied by the difference in populations falling with the jurisdiction of the court or
the various levels of litigation (generated by either the population or the number of
6 The results and methodology by Djankov et al. (2003), although very relevant, cannot be used in the
experiment proposed in this paper because, as mentioned, they concern international elements for a specific
year. Therefore, they cannot capture the variations in efficiency within a specific country. The latter may be
caused by differences in the application of the Civil Procedural Law and not by the Civil Procedural Law
itself (see further Mora-Sanguinetti 2010).
7 Other indices are also constructed and tested in Appendix A of this paper.
8 It should be noted that some extrajudicial solutions may be found by the parties, such as sending the case
to arbitration. However, only a judge can order an eviction in Spain.
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lawyers per capita).9 At the same time, the resources invested in the administration of
justice differ from region to region.10 The key issue is thus to define a correct measure
of judicial inefficacy. This section (and Appendix A of this paper) is directed to that
task. It is in fact possible to observe that the efficacy of the judicial system diverges
among the different regions of Spain over time (allowing the construction of a panel
with information on the functioning of the judicial system). As argued before, we may
expect that in the most ineffective regions, where it is more difficult to evict a non-
paying tenant or to have the payment of rent enforced through the judicial system,
landlords will opt to quit the tenancy market, and thus the share of tenancy in the
province will diminish (see Sect. 3.2 for a further theoretical discussion).
In order to construct a set of judicial system indicators useful for the analysis of the
housing market, a relevant question arises: what are the specific procedures required
to recover an unpaid rent in Spain? The CPL (2000) establishes a specific procedure
for recovering such debt: first, a “declaratory judgment” will “declare” the existence
of the debt and the obligation of the debtor to pay. We can call that element the “first
stage” or “first procedure” because the possibility remains that the tenant decides not
to pay the debt. In that case, a final or definitive procedure (“executory process”) takes
place. In the “execution” stage, the creditor asks the judge to “execute” the debt. As a
result of this final procedure, the judge will seize the amount from the bank accounts
of the debtor and will probably order his eviction from the dwelling.
The General Council of the Judicial Power (Consejo General del Poder Judicial,
CGPJ) neither collects nor publishes data on the duration of legal proceedings in the
Spanish courts. However, information can be gleaned from its database reporting the
number of cases filed, resolved and still pending in the Spanish judicial system by
subject, region, court11 and year. Using that database, a relative measure of efficacy
can be constructed for the enforcement of each procedure: the congestion rate (see
Eq. 1 below). The congestion rate is defined as the ratio between the sum of pending
cases (measured at the beginning of the period) plus new cases in a specific year and
the cases resolved in that same year (Padilla et al. 2007). A lower congestion rate is
related to greater efficacy of the judicial system.
Congestion ratei,t = Pending casesi,t + New casesi,t
Cases resolvedi,t
(1)
Three more relative measures of inefficacy are computed in Appendix A: the “resolu-
tion rate”, the “pending cases rate” and the “pending-plus-new cases rate” (ppnc in the
tables). As discussed below in Sect. 4.1, alternative estimates including a measure of
9 It should be noted, however, that both the effect of population and litigation in this relationship are taken
into account in the different specifications of the model developed in this paper.
10 The “Comunidades Autónomas” (regions) have some powers related to the administration of justice in
Spain. Even though the “judicial power” is not properly transferred to the regions, management of resources
of the judicial system is influenced by the policies developed by the regions. For instance, they decide how
muchmoney is invested in new courts each year in their territories, even though the new courts are integrated
in a centrally governed system.
11 The courts analyzed in this study are the “juzgados de primera instancia” and the “juzgados de primera
instancia e instrucción”. Those are the courts available for the parties at first instance.
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Table 1 Judicial system variables
Type of procedure Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Declaratory Prtcongestion 350 1.53 0.36 1.03 4.17
Declaratory Prtresolution 350 0.92 0.14 0.39 1.18
Declaratory Prtpendency 350 0.41 0.16 0.13 1.59
Execution Excongestion 350 3.97 1.20 1.20 9.99
Execution Exresolution 350 0.87 0.20 0.42 2.02
Execution Expendency 350 2.77 0.98 0.46 7.59
Execution ppnc*1000 350 17.39 7.78 0.78 36.96
Mortgage Mortcongestion 350 2.72 0.98 0.36 8.50
Mortgage Mortresolution 350 1.03 0.41 0.22 3.67
Mortgage Mortpendency 350 1.62 0.62 0.09 5.29
Mortgage Mortppnc 350 0.72 0.45 0.01 2.81
Source: CGPJ (2010) and self elaboration
“litigation” by province (calculated as the number of lawyers per capita) (following
Carmignani and Giacomelli 2010) have been provided. The introduction of these “per
capita” measures allow for a robustness exercise as the population differs quite sig-
nificantly between different provinces.
The CGPJ offers homogeneous data for the various procedures for the period 2001–
2007.12 For the purposes of the analysis herein, I have chosen the provincial level,
although more disaggregated data on the judicial system is available (at the level of a
particular court and judicial district (partido judicial)). This is due to the lack of more
disaggregated data in other variables such as income per capita (or the PPP correc-
tions). Another disadvantage of this should be noted. The rental market is mainly a
local market, so when agents take their decisions, their probable point of reference is
the situation in a sub-provincial market (their specific city and not the situation in other
cities within the same province). However, an analysis at the provincial level remains
valuable as we can assume that agents in a province are more likely to be aware of,
and influenced by, problems in the judicial system in the surrounding markets than
those of the rest of the country.
In the tables the prefix “prt” precedes the efficacy measure related to procedures in
the “declaratory stage” (or as we called it, “first” procedure): prtcongestion. The prefix
“ex” precedes the efficacy measure related to the executions: excongestion. Table 1
shows the descriptive statistics for those computations (also for the alternative efficacy
measures studied in Appendix A). Table 2 shows the results for the congestion rate
when studied for the executions (excongestion) in the period 2001–2007.13
An average congestion rate of 3.97 over the period 2001–2007 (see Table 1) indi-
cates that around four cases (summing up the pending cases and the new cases arriving
12 Note that the new CPL (2000) entered into force on 7 January 2001. This new CPL radically changed
several aspects of civil procedure in Spain (Mora-Sanguinetti 2010) and therefore it is not advisable to
relate the data after 2001 with previous observations.
13 Excluding Ceuta and Melilla (no information is available for these regions).
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Table 2 Judicial congestion rate by province (execution)
Province 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Álava 1.20 1.88 1.25 2.62 4.28 1.23 2.28
Albacete 3.81 3.00 4.78 3.01 2.95 2.46 3.49
Alicante 3.77 4.68 6.01 4.46 5.72 6.23 5.64
Almería 3.08 4.38 3.92 4.14 3.54 3.60 4.11
Avila 2.52 1.85 3.48 2.95 4.19 5.64 3.74
Badajoz 3.30 3.76 3.25 3.28 3.81 3.95 4.52
Baleares 3.44 3.30 4.94 6.70 6.36 8.99 9.47
Barcelona 4.07 4.80 5.34 4.79 4.76 4.99 4.98
Burgos 2.31 3.28 3.14 2.79 3.36 3.16 2.95
Cáceres 3.92 5.93 3.41 4.62 3.31 3.28 4.32
Cádiz 3.55 3.29 3.71 3.99 3.08 4.89 3.91
Castellón 4.72 5.50 9.99 5.33 5.40 6.42 5.95
Ciudad Real 3.62 5.50 6.89 4.11 5.02 5.02 5.30
Córdoba 2.13 3.08 3.52 4.92 3.69 3.15 2.79
A Corurña 3.56 3.96 3.24 3.70 4.27 4.39 4.60
Cuenca 2.99 4.81 4.11 4.26 5.48 5.56 4.84
Girona 2.87 4.33 3.77 4.24 4.23 4.70 5.30
Granada 2.62 3.07 3.48 4.04 3.81 5.94 4.53
Guadalajara 6.14 3.99 4.58 5.20 2.80 4.43 5.78
Guipúzcoa 2.12 1.94 1.65 2.00 2.52 2.68 2.39
Huelva 2.89 3.51 2.76 3.52 3.92 4.82 3.79
Huesca 2.69 3.88 4.31 2.90 2.97 3.27 3.93
Jaén 2.54 2.47 3.63 3.45 3.37 3.32 3.16
León 3.46 3.98 4.88 3.49 4.36 3.18 5.54
Lleida 4.52 4.31 5.01 4.13 4.47 4.50 5.30
La Rioja 2.75 2.32 2.93 3.99 3.95 3.15 3.43
Lugo 2.83 2.75 2.57 2.51 2.89 3.67 4.30
Madrid 3.83 4.66 5.22 5.23 4.89 5.74 5.53
Málaga 3.04 3.45 3.30 3.89 4.05 3.98 4.07
Murcia 5.34 4.88 4.53 4.83 5.32 5.39 4.78
Navarra 2.87 4.67 3.84 3.99 4.56 5.16 4.06
Ourense 3.92 2.91 3.16 3.43 4.04 4.47 4.86
Asturias 4.05 3.90 4.26 3.91 4.31 4.01 4.14
Palencia 2.88 3.27 2.58 4.40 4.58 3.08 4.13
Las Palmas 3.07 4.56 6.16 4.61 5.13 5.16 4.89
Pontevedra 2.72 3.25 3.19 3.46 3.86 5.23 4.11
Salamanca 2.16 3.42 2.55 2.90 2.32 3.35 3.04
Santa Cruz de Tenerife 2.91 3.03 4.65 4.51 5.55 5.17 4.99
Cantabria 2.85 2.89 3.44 3.45 4.05 3.84 3.15
Segovia 2.51 2.68 3.20 3.08 2.54 3.85 3.96
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Table 2 continued
Province 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sevilla 2.83 3.25 3.81 3.58 3.33 4.23 5.17
Soria 4.42 2.62 3.84 1.90 2.32 3.43 2.96
Tarragona 4.22 4.62 4.64 4.69 3.81 4.88 4.75
Teruel 3.25 6.07 5.56 5.41 5.17 6.11 4.75
Toledo 4.38 3.98 4.48 4.77 4.40 5.27 3.88
Valencia 5.23 5.71 6.12 5.29 5.64 6.39 6.13
Valladolid 1.30 4.28 2.10 4.03 3.86 4.07 3.72
Vizcaya 1.76 1.80 2.69 1.91 2.83 2.64 2.21
Zamora 3.62 3.58 3.22 2.77 2.76 3.75 3.93
Zaragoza 2.98 4.70 4.84 3.52 4.18 5.05 5.20
Source: CGPJ (2010) and self elaboration
to the courts in a specific year) were awaiting resolution while the courts were able to
resolve just one. In the worst case, this amount was almost 10. As we may observe,
therewas, on average, a difference of 5.98 congestion points between themost efficient
and the least efficient province throughout the period.
Figure 1 represents this quotient for the years 2001 and 2007. A decrease in the
efficacy of the system can be observed throughout the period. Looking at the graph, it
is also clear that no specific provincial pattern seems to emerge in the reduction of the
efficacy of the judicial system. However, the Basque Country has a better performance
over the entire period.
Note that Law 19/2009 (see Sect. 1) introduced several minor changes to the pro-
cedures of the CPL. These reforms can be summarized as follows: First, it generalized
the use of a specific type of procedure (juicio verbal) to resolve all eviction-related
conflicts. Secondly, it removed some of the options that the tenant had to hinder the
declaratory judgment. Finally, it accelerated the execution of the declaratory judg-
ments. These changes could accelerate the functioning of the judicial system, improv-
ing the figures discussed above. However, there is still no data available in order to
analyze those effects.
What was the evolution of the property rate during this period (2001–2007)? The
proportion of property among the total number of primary dwellings in Spain (called
“Prprop” in the tables) is in fact chosen as a dependent variable in this research. That
proportion is the aggregate counterpart of the individual housing tenure decision. The
data are obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Housing (2008) and are available for
the period 2001–2007 for 50 Spanish provinces (excluding Ceuta and Melilla).14 This
classification divides the primary residences into three groups: dwellings in the prop-
erty market, dwellings in the tenancy market, and “transferred dwellings” (cessions or
non-profitable use of the houses). On average, in 2007, 88.2% of the dwellings were
14 Note that the data is provided in November of each year and not in January. That fact is taken into
account in the estimations.
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Fig. 1 Congestion rate (executory stage)
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in the property market, 9.8% were in the tenancy market and 1.9% were “transferred
houses” (cessions).
On average, the share of property in the Spanish economy is very high (with a
mean of 88.6% over the whole period) although some strong differences can still be
found among provinces (share below 80% in the Balearic Islands, Las Palmas, Girona
or Barcelona over several years and above 94% in Lugo, Soria or Castellón at the
end of the period). Thus, there is some ground to explain and exploit inter-provincial
differences. Table 3 presents the property shares between 2001 and 2007.
Moreover, some strong dynamics can be found at a provincial level. The province
with the highest proportion of property in 2007 was 3.9% higher than the equivalent
in 2001. More importantly, it should be noted that there is a difference of at least 14%
during this period between the province with a higher proportion of property and that
with the smaller one. Thus, some local factors may be affecting the provincial markets
that differ from those identified at an aggregate level.
The aimof this paper is to test econometrically (taking into account all the usual con-
trols analyzed and identified in the literature) if any significant relation exists between
an increasing rate of inefficacy in the judicial system and the observed increase in the
property share in the period analyzed. An increase in that proportion is expected if,
ceteris paribus, the judicial systembecomesmore ineffective, that is, if the institutional
environment for renting becomes more problematic.
3 Modeling the effects of institutions on housing tenure outcomes
3.1 Empirical literature review
The literature identifies a wide group of socio-economic factors such as the permanent
income of individuals, the relative price of buying versus renting (or the user cost),
financial restrictions, taxation and some demographic variables.15 Those factors affect
the decision to buy or rent a dwelling (from the point of view of a potential tenant or
a potential buyer) or the decision to place a property on the rental market (from the
perspective of a potential landlord).
Although all the determinants affecting one side of the market will have an effect on
the equilibrium share of property or tenancy of the economy, some studies distinguish
those factors as mainly “demand factors” or “supply” factors (affecting the decisions
of landlordsmore directly). Other determinants, such as prices, would affect both sides
of the contracts at the same time and should be treated as endogenous.
This subsection aims to provide a limited survey of both the empirical literature
and the most studied variables affecting the housing tenure choice. Special attention
is paid to the “demand” or “supply” considerations studied.
Firstly, several works discussed the effect of pure demographic factors such as the
proportion of young people or married couples in the population on the share of prop-
erty of the economy (as an outcome of the housing tenure choice) (see Jaffe and Rosen
15 Other factors cited in the introduction, such as the tenancy laws, are not studied in the remainder of this
paper as they will not introduce any inter-regional variation to exploit in the estimations.
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Table 3 Share of property in the Spanish provinces
Province 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Álava 91.65 91.27 90.61 90.22 89.73 89.31 88.63
Albacete 88.47 89.59 90.48 91.25 92.06 92.82 92.82
Alicante 89.04 89.50 89.98 90.41 90.80 91.36 91.36
Almería 85.60 86.26 87.13 88.19 88.97 89.79 89.79
Ávila 90.61 91.28 91.91 92.58 93.22 93.84 93.84
Badajoz 86.17 87.09 87.83 88.48 89.14 89.74 89.74
Baleares 77.37 78.41 79.76 81.16 82.21 82.91 82.91
Barcelona 80.88 80.42 80.12 80.14 79.94 79.91 79.91
Burgos 89.29 89.01 88.91 88.79 88.89 88.76 88.76
Cáceres 85.47 86.30 87.41 88.20 89.06 89.82 89.82
Cádiz 83.27 83.43 83.85 84.44 84.91 85.22 85.22
Castellón 89.01 90.17 91.20 92.29 93.27 94.44 94.44
Ciudad Real 89.68 90.15 90.71 91.08 91.62 92.59 91.95
Córdoba 88.73 89.27 89.83 90.35 91.10 91.67 91.67
A Coruña 84.79 85.46 86.18 87.05 87.69 88.20 88.20
Cuenca 91.32 90.66 89.97 89.33 88.86 88.29 88.29
Girona 82.46 81.95 81.55 80.33 79.45 78.85 78.85
Granada 86.43 87.42 87.99 88.74 89.54 90.05 90.05
Guadalajara 90.60 91.08 91.40 91.91 92.36 92.75 92.75
Guipúzcoa 90.12 89.55 88.90 88.36 88.12 87.58 87.58
Huelva 87.46 88.16 89.11 89.90 90.51 91.19 91.19
Huesca 88.49 88.47 88.30 88.21 87.88 87.33 87.33
Jaén 89.20 89.98 90.84 91.60 92.49 93.25 93.25
León 85.39 86.14 86.71 87.27 87.78 88.38 88.38
Lleida 85.78 87.52 89.03 90.34 91.58 92.71 92.71
La Rioja 88.78 89.52 90.40 90.97 91.38 91.99 91.99
Lugo 90.69 91.85 92.78 93.74 94.66 95.58 95.58
Madrid 84.49 84.24 83.91 83.62 83.13 83.37 83.06
Málaga 86.25 86.09 85.77 85.73 85.69 87.24 85.53
Murcia 88.01 88.67 89.30 90.10 90.81 91.54 91.54
Navarra 90.14 90.67 91.42 92.08 92.66 93.17 93.17
Ourense 90.03 89.20 88.61 87.78 87.16 86.51 86.50
Asturias 84.49 85.08 85.46 85.92 86.25 86.71 86.71
Palencia 88.78 89.36 89.89 90.55 91.33 91.95 91.93
Las Palmas 78.30 78.96 80.02 80.58 80.75 81.47 81.47
Pontevedra 85.94 85.58 85.48 85.89 86.20 85.87 86.19
Salamanca 88.85 89.30 89.73 90.30 90.85 91.33 91.33
Santa Cruz de Tenerife 81.45 82.08 82.90 83.34 83.86 84.58 84.58
Cantabria 88.90 89.29 89.85 90.29 90.98 91.36 91.36
Segovia 87.75 87.96 87.86 87.97 87.69 87.96 87.96
123
350 SERIEs (2012) 3:339–365
Table 3 continued
Province 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sevilla 89.08 89.05 88.81 88.48 88.35 88.66 88.04
Soria 89.48 90.74 92.04 93.24 94.35 95.36 95.36
Tarragona 86.06 87.05 87.93 88.87 89.41 90.22 90.22
Teruel 89.35 90.25 91.14 92.20 93.18 94.00 94.00
Toledo 90.02 90.55 91.23 91.83 92.31 92.79 92.79
Valencia 89.79 90.16 90.44 90.68 90.93 91.21 91.21
Valladolid 88.56 89.22 89.64 90.02 90.46 90.90 90.90
Vizcaya 91.55 91.81 92.33 92.71 93.23 93.50 93.50
Zamora 90.82 91.29 91.86 92.36 92.83 93.27 93.27
Zaragoza 85.86 87.05 87.37 87.56 87.67 87.91 87.91
Source: Ministry of Housing of Spain (2008) and self elaboration
1979 or Green 1996). We would expect the tenancy rate to be positively related to the
proportion of young people in the population but negatively related to an increase in
the share of married couples. Following the same references, those factors are usually
identified as “demand” factors. In fact, the age of a landlord has not been a point of
discussion in the same research.
In turn, another demographic factor, the population density, would mainly affect
the decisions of landlords (the supply side) and not tenants. Linneman (1986) argues
that landlords face reduced costs of monitoring and higher efficiency in supplying
housing services in the case of highly populated towns. Thus, we would expect to find
a negative relation between home ownership and population density on the landlord’s
side (also Fisher and Jaffe 2003).
The effect of wealth in the house tenure decision is also widely studied in the liter-
ature (De Leeuw and Ekanem 1971; Haurin et al. 1996). Several studies have found
that, among other factors, the rate of home ownership is positively related to GDP per
capita or similar income measures (reducing the demand for tenancy), although that
relation is not always significant (Fisher and Jaffe 2003).
Credit constraints and financial capacity are also determinants of the tenancy or
property share observed in the economy. They mainly affect the tenant/buyer side as
the financial constraint will prevent some tenants from buying a property (Jaffe and
Rosen 1979; Hargreaves 2003; Lauridsen and Skak 2007; Mayordomo 2008). In fact,
this effect may be coincident with age, as younger individuals may face higher con-
straints because their actual income ismuch lower than their future earnings (Lafayette
et al. 1995).
Finally, the price of renting versus buying affects both sides of a tenancy contract
(or a home purchase agreement). In other words, the “price” can be understood as the
outcome of the contracts in the market. In any case, the higher the price of buying a
home (compared to the price of renting a dwelling), the higher the number of individ-
uals who will choose to rent. The opposite argument would hold for the other side of
the contract (the landlord/seller). Themeasure of “prices” takes very different forms in
123
SERIEs (2012) 3:339–365 351
the literature: some works have estimated the effect of rental prices (Jaffe and Rosen,
1979), while others have opted for relative measures. For instance, Hendershott and
Shilling (1980) studied the effect of the relative cost of owner-occupied dwellings and
rental prices. In turn, Rodríguez and Barrios (2004) and Barrios García and Rodríguez
Hernández (2004) calculated a user cost taking into account both the prices of buying
and of renting and some related fiscal issues. Several types of public intervention, such
as fiscal incentives or the provision of public housing, may play a significant role as
well (Rosen 1979; Rosen and Rosen 1980; Lauridsen and Skak 2007).
Thus, in general, while the demand for housing services is directly driven by a
group of heterogeneous factors ranging from demography to wealth, the supply side
(landlords and sellers) is mainly affected by the interaction with costs, frictions and
prices (derived from some heterogeneous factors such as the user cost of the proper-
ties, the actual relative prices of selling versus renting, the population density or the
regulatory measures introduced by the tenancy laws). If more frictions are suffered in
the tenancy market, some landlords will decide to quit the tenancy market.
In this context, one extra “cost” that a landlord faces, and which has not been
studied in the literature cited above, is “judicial inefficacy”. Judicial inefficacy can
be considered then as an exogenous variable affecting the equilibrium price (together
with the quantity of housing services in the market) affecting the equilibrium through
movements in the supply curve. Section 3.2 provides a theoretical framework for that
argument.
3.2 Theoretical background
To integrate all of the reasoning set out in this paper, it seems useful to discuss how
agents (on the demand or supply side of the market) behave in theoretical terms when
they are faced with the housing tenure choice. Moreover, it is useful to examine, in
that same theoretical context, how those agents behave when they are confronted with
an ineffective judicial system.
Henderson and Ioannides (1983) offer a useful model for this issue as they study the
behavior of both owner-occupiers and renters through their decisions to consume and
invest in housing services. If the investment demand for housing is sufficiently large
relative to consumption demand, the individual will own a dwelling and will rent part
of the free space in the housing market. Thus, he will be a landlord offering housing
services. On the contrary, if the consumption demand is larger than the investment
demand, the individual will choose to rent and will not own a house (we will observe
him as a tenant consuming housing services but not investing).
In the model, the housing consumption demand will depend on several factors such
as wealth, the income path or financial restrictions. For instance, an individual with
less wealth at the beginning of his lifetime will be a tenant if he is also confronted
with financial restrictions.
It is even more relevant to observe how the investment side works. If the profit-
ability of investing in housing diminishes, less “space” will be offered in the market
(that is to say, the number of “landlords” will diminish in the economy). In fact, the
profitability of the investment in housing services is affected by several factors such
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as maintenance costs, taxation or depreciation. This paper studies the effects on the
market of a very specific transaction cost: the judicial “inefficacy” which exclusively
affects landlords.
As noted in the introduction, the decision to place a dwelling on the rental market
implies some transaction costs (basically the enforcement of the contract over time).
In other words, renting implies the establishment of a long-term relationship with
another agent in the market (the tenant) and involving some risk (and therefore some
enforcement costs over time, such as the use of the judicial system). From a theoretical
point of view, the implication of an increased transaction cost is that increased legal
costs reduce the profitability of “investing” in housing, so some agents decide to put
less “space” in the rental market.
Following Henderson and Ioannides (1983), individuals maximize the following
multi-period utility function:
U (x, f (u)hc) + V (w)
where U stands for the utility obtained from the consumption bundle, V (w) stands
for the indirect utility function of wealth remaining after period 1 and the function f
has the following properties: f ′(u) > 0 and f ′′(u) < 0. The services obtained from
a house (as a durable good) are determined by u (the rate of utilization) and h (the
capacity). x stands for the consumption in period 1 of the numéraire.
If the individual is an owner, he will maximize the utility function subject to the
following constraints:
y1 = x + Phc + S
w = y2 + S(1 + r) + Phc − T (u)hc
where T (u) is the utilization cost function, y represents income, P is the market
purchase price of a unit of housing stock, S is savings and r is the rate of interest.
If the individual is a tenant, the constraints he faces are the following:
y1 = x + Rhc + S
w = y2 + S(1 + r) − τ(u)hc
where R stands for the rental price of housing and τ(u) is the tenant cost function.
To introduce judicial inefficacy (J ) in themodel ofHenderson and Ioannides (1983),
I could model the utilization cost function of the dwelling as:
T (u) = α Ju2
J will increase the transaction costs for the landlord. Four different ways to measure
J are explained in Sect. 2 and Appendix A. In any case, the judicial inefficacy (J )
will take always positive values. α is a parameter and u is the rate of utilization. As
required, T (u) is a convex function: T ′(u) > 0 and T ′′(u) > 0.
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On the other hand, the tenant cost function could take the following simple form
that does not depend on the judicial efficiency:
τ(u) = u2
where τ(u) is also a convex function. τ ′(u) > 0 and τ ′′(u) > 0.
With those two cost functions, the equilibrium condition of the Henderson–
Ioannides model will take the following form:
r P
1 + r = R −





R(1 + r) − r P
α J − 1
where, ∂u
∂ J < 0,
∂u
∂ R > 0,
∂u
∂r < 0 and
∂u
∂ P < 0, if 1 − α J > 0.
Thus, following that derivation, in equilibrium the rate of utilization will depend
negatively on the judicial inefficacy. As previously stated, judicial inefficacy can be
understood as a cost for the landlord. As a result, if judicial costs increase, less “space”
will be put into the tenancy market (and thus, theoretically, we would observe a less
developed tenancy market). Another theoretical argument about how agents behave
when they confront a risk of non-payment of rent can be found in Casas-Arce and Saiz
(2010).
u = g(J− , r−, R+, P− )
Even though we consider J and r as exogenous variables affecting the equilibrium,
R and P (together with the quantity of housing services in the market) are defined
within the model. In an econometric implementation they should therefore be treated
as endogenous and thus they must be instrumented. For instance, an exogenous shock
increasing judicial inefficacywill affect the equilibrium price and the quantity of hous-
ing services through a shift in the supply side (or investment) of housing services but
not through the demand curve as defined before. Thus, in the case of an econometric
estimation of the supply curve, we will have to instrument the price (or the user cost)
using for instance strictly “demand” instruments (that is, demand shifters which are
not affecting the supply).
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Model
The objective of this research is to offer estimations of the effect of the inefficacy of
the judicial system on the proportion of property in the economy. As discussed above,
123
354 SERIEs (2012) 3:339–365
judicial inefficacy can be understood as an extra cost that landlords face when they rent
their properties in the market. Therefore, following the reasoning offered in Sect. 3, I
propose to estimate a supply curve.
Then, the following model is proposed (Eq. 2):
Prpropi,t = c +
∑
ctTt + β1 Usercosti,t + β2 Excongestioni,t + β3 Densityi,t
+(ηi + νi,t) (2)
β2 is the effect of judicial inefficacy (“excongestion” in this setup), on the share
of property, “prprop”. As previously discussed, we expect that the population density,
“density”, is negatively related to the property share. The price should enter the equa-
tion with a positive sign as we are estimating a supply curve. A detailed description
of the variables used in this study is provided in Table 4.
Themeasure of judicial inefficacy could be affected by the litigation in the province.
In order to provide results that take this possibility into account, alternative estimates
including a measure of “litigation” by province are provided in this paper. “Litigation”
is approximated by the number of lawyers per capita, “Lawyerspc” (see for instance,
Carmignani and Giacomelli 2010). In that case, the model takes the following form
(Eq. 3):
Prpropi,t = c +
∑
ctTt + β1 Usercosti,t + β2 Excongestioni,t
+β3 Lawyerspci,t + β4 Densityi,t + (ηi + νi,t) (3)
The “price” (taking the form of a user cost, “usercost”) will be an endogenous
variable as we face a simultaneity problem. That is, the price and quantity are jointly
determined by the demand and supply curves of the market. Thus, I will instrument
the price using several demand shifters.
I choose as instruments a set of variables directly affecting the demand side of
the market: the proportion of young people in the province, ppob2039 and its lagged
value, the proxy to credit constraint, credit and its lagged value, the lagged value of
income per capita, ln GDPpc, and the proportion of social housing in the province,
Shousing. Also the lagged user cost will be included as an instrument. As explained in
Table 4, the measure “credit” takes account of the effects on mortgage lending implied
by the inefficacy of the judicial system when solving mortgage conflicts. To choose
the set of instruments and provide evidence of their validity, the Hansen J statistic (as
over-identification test) is computed with satisfactory results in all cases.16 Note that,
in general, the strategy of including the lagged dependent variables of Eq. 1 (or 2) as
instruments has been avoided (thus providing a more robust experiment).
Following Sect. 2, judicial efficacy has been studied at both stages of the pro-
cedure (declaratory and execution) in the form of a congestion rate. Prtcongestion
and excongestion enter the equation lagged several periods, up to four, taking into
account that the decision to put a dwelling into the tenancy market may take into
account the “judicial environment” observed some periods before. This fact would
16 Note that I did not assume homoskedasticity. Otherwise, the Sargan’s statistic would be reported.
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also mitigate any problems of endogeneity of the judicial variables. In any case, there
are no reasons to suspect the endogeneity of the judicial variables in this research. The
courts considered in this study (“juzgados de primera instancia” and “juzgados de
primera instancia e instruccion”) are not specialized courts and resolve a wide range
of conflicts, from inheritance conflicts to bankruptcy proceedings. Thus the distribu-
tion of tenancy conflicts (generated in part by the amount of tenancy and property
contracts in the province) is not necessarily influencing the distribution of “juzgados
de primera instancia” and “juzgados de primera instancia e instrucción”. Judges in
Spain are also obliged to process and resolve cases in chronological order of entry,
and therefore cannot give preference to a specific type of conflict.
The model is estimated following a two-step (instrumental variables) generalized
method of moments (GMM estimation) (Woorldridge 2001; Arellano 2002; Baum
et al. 2003).17
Fixed effects (FE) are included in all the estimations. Standard errors are clustered
in order to make them robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Time
dummies are also included to take the cycle into account. Wald tests of significance
for those time dummies are reported in the tables. Table 5 reports the results when
estimating both Eq. 2 (models 1 and 2 in the Table) and Eq. 3 (models 3 and 4 in the
Table).
4.2 Results
As an initial result, it is important to note that the efficacy of the declaratory stage
has no significant impact on the share of property.18 Therefore, this paper focuses its
analysis on the final or definitive step (execution). Nevertheless, this is an interesting
result in and of itself, as will be discussed in the conclusions.
First of all, it is worth noting that the user cost (Table 5) enters the equation with a
positive sign. The sign confirms that we have estimated a supply curve once we take
into account that the over-identification tests were passed satisfactorily.
The variable density has the expected (negative) sign in all cases and is significant
at 5 or 1% level.
Finally, looking at the results for the judicial variables, we find the expected effects.
First of all, it is found that a higher congestion rate, that is, a lower efficacy of the
judicial system, attracts more houses to the propertymarket. That is to say that a “prob-
lematic” tenancy market prevents the owners/landlords from placing their dwellings
on the tenancy market.
Table 5 shows that an increase in one point in the congestion rate would increase the
share of property by around 0.14–0.16 percentage points. Thus, taking the example
of Madrid, the decrease in the congestion rate would attract around 3,400 dwellings
to the rental market. In Barcelona, the increase would be around 3,100 dwellings and
17 Under the presence of heteroskedasticity, GMM estimators are more efficient than IV-robust ones.
18 The estimations are available on demand.
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Table 5 Effects of the judicial congestion rate
Model 1 2 3 4
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE FE FE
Excongestion (t-3) 0.14 0.13
0.05*** 0.043***
Excongestion (t-4) 0.16 0.16
0.07** 0.07**
User cost 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04
0.03** 0.03 0.03** 0.03
Density −0.07 −0.05 −0.07 −0.05





Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 250 200 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0.85 0.89 0.80 0.87
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0 0 0
Dependent variable: Share of property
(Clustered) Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients
lnstrumented: User cost
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), In GDPpc (t-1). Shousing
*** p < 1%
** p < 5%
* p < 10%
in Valencia around 1,400 dwellings.19 Those results are significant at around 5 or 1%
respectively. The variable “Lawyerspc” is insignificant and does not affect the results.
Appendix A provides a discussion of the results of the model when alternative mea-
sures of judicial efficiency are computed (“pending cases rate”, “resolution rate” and
the “pending-plus-new cases rate”). The results are consistent with those presented
here.
5 Conclusions
This research presents some estimations of the effect of the efficacy of the judicial sys-
tem on the proportion of property in the Spanish provinces. The problem is analyzed
19 An interesting experiment is to calculate how many dwellings, according to the model, would be won
by the tenancy market of Madrid if the rate of congestion in Madrid improves to the level of the average
congestion rate of the Basque Country in 2007. In that case, the increase in the number of dwellings for
rent in Madrid would be between 9,600 and 12,100. The same experiment in the case of Barcelona would
lead to an increase in rental housing of between 7,300 and 9,100 dwellings.
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econometrically through panel data techniques. Specifically, the generalized method
of moments (2-step GMM) is used in the estimations as several instrumental variables
are taken into account. This study is the first one in the economic literature to tackle
the case of Spain at the local level.
The judicial efficacy is measured through the construction of a “congestion” indi-
cator at two stages of the procedure: the declaratory stage and its final executory
stage.
This research does not find any significant impact of judicial efficacy at the declar-
atory stage on the housing property share. However, this research concludes that an
increase in judicial efficacy at the execution stage would have a positive, although
minor, impact on the share of property in the Spanish provinces. The effect amounts
to around 0.15 percentage points of the housing market (higher effects are found if
other efficacy measures are taken into account) (see Appendix A). That effect would
denote that homeowners avoid the tenancy market when they cannot enforce their
contracts.
The discussions presented in this research give some grounds to improve the effi-
cacy of the judicial system, at least at the execution stage, in order to develop the
Spanish tenancy market. In this sense, future research based on this paper could eval-
uate the effects of the recent reforms of the tenancy market in Spain, introduced by
Law 19/2009, when the relevant data is available.
Appendix A: Estimations with alternative judicial efficacy measures
Judicial efficacy can be measured in different ways. This paper has opted to study the
“congestion rate”, even though other efficacy measures could be computed.
This Appendix presents the results of the study if three alternative efficacy mea-
sures are taken into account: the “pending cases rate”, the “resolution rate” and the
“pending-plus-new cases rate”. The pending cases rate is defined as the ratio between
pending cases in a specific year and the cases resolved in the same period. The reso-
lution rate is defined as the ratio between the cases resolved and the cases that entered
the system for a specific year. Finally, the “pending-plus-new cases rate” (ppnc) is
calculated as the sum of the new cases and the pending cases (measured at the begin-
ning of the year), divided by the population of the province in that year (see equations
grouped as 4).
Pending cases ratei,t = Pending casesi,t
Cases resolvedi,t
Re solution ratei,t = Cases resolvedi,t
New casesi,t
(4)
Pending − plus − new cases ratei,t = Pending casesi,t + New casesi,t
Populationi,t
As a measure, the “pending-plus-new cases rate” tries to take into account that the
workload of the courts may vary due to the different populations of the provinces.
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Table 6 Effects of the judicial pendency rate
Model 1 2 3 4
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE FE FE
Expendency (t-3) 0.18 0.16
0.09* 0.08**
Expendency (t-4) 0.27 0.27
0.13** 0.14**
User cost 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06
0.03** 0.03* 0.03** 0.03*
Density −0.07 −0.05 −0.07 −0.05





Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 250 200 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0.73 0.81 0.70 0.82
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0 0 0
Dependent variable: Share of property
(Clustered) Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients
Instrumented: User cost
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), In GDPpc (t-1), Shousing
*** p < 1%
** p < 5%
* p < 10%
A higher “resolution rate” and a lower “pending cases rate” are related to greater
efficacy of the judicial system. A higher “pending-plus-new cases rate” is again a
proxy of congestion of the judicial system (although related to the population of the
province) and therefore it can be expected that a higher workload per capita is related
to a lower efficacy. Some summary statistics are included in Table 1.
With respect to the first measure of efficacy related to executions, expendency, we
can observe the following: On average (see Table 1), almost three times more cases
were pending (waiting to be resolved) in the execution stage with respect to the cases
that the courts were able to solve. Although some provinces had, on average, very
good results (pendency rate of 0.46), other provinces had more than seven times more
cases waiting to be resolved than the average workload they were able to resolve in a
year.
With respect to the resolution rate, we can say that, on average, the judicial system
was able to resolve nearly the same amount of cases as were entering the courts (res-
olution rate of 0.87) at the execution stage. This does not imply a constant workload
because some conflicts may be waiting on the list at the beginning of the year (this
aspect is better analyzed with more complete measures of efficacy as the pendency
cases rate and the congestion rate). Even though some provinces underperformed quite
radically (minimum of 0.42), others were able to resolve two timesmore cases than the
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Table 7 Effects of the judicial resolution rate
Model 1 2 3 4
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM
Data transformation FE FE FE FE
Exresolution (t-3) −0.03 −0.01
0.31 0.29
Exresolution (t-4) −0.82 −0.88
0.32** 0.34**
User cost 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
0.03** 0.02*** 0.03** 0.02***
Density −0.07 −0.05 −0.07 −0.06





Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 250 200 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0.79 0.87 0.67 0.91
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0 0 0
Dependent variable: Share of property
(Clustered) Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients
Instrumented: User cost
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), In GDPpc (t-1), Shousing
*** p < 1%
** p < 5%
* p < 10%
number of new cases entering the system, and thus were able to reduce the workload
for future periods.
Finally, with respect to the “pending-plus-new cases rate” we can say that, on aver-
age, 17.38 cases (summing the pending and the new cases) per 1,000 inhabitants were
waiting to be solved. As in other cases, some strong differences by province can be
found, from around 1 case per 1,000 inhabitants to 36.
As occurred with the case of congestion, no significant results are found when the
models are computed taking into account the efficacy at the “declaratory” stage.
Table 6 shows the results of the estimations when we consider the pendency cases
rate instead of the congestion rate as a measure of efficacy. The results are consis-
tent with the previous ones. An increase of the pendency rate of one point would
increase the property share of the province by around 0.16–0.27 percentage points
(around 3,700–6200 houses in Madrid, around 3,300–5,600 in Barcelona and around
1,500–2,500 in Valencia). The results are significant at 5% level.
Then, an increase in one point of the resolution rate (see Table 7) implies a reduction
in the property rate of around 0.82–0.88 percentage points (that would be approxi-
mately 18,800–20,100 houses passing from the property market to the tenancy mar-
ket and related options in Madrid, 17,000–18,300 in the case of Barcelona, and
1,500–2,500 in the case of Valencia).
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Table 8 Effects of the PPNC rate
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Method of estimation 2-Step 2-Step 2-Step 2-Step 2-Step 2-Step
Data transformation GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE
ppnc*1000 0.14 0.13
0.07** 0.07*
ppnc*1000 (t-1) 0.18 0.17
0.05*** 0.05***
ppnc*1000 (t-2) 0.15 0.14
0.05*** 0.05***
User cost 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05
0.02** 0.02** 0.03* 0.02** 0.02 0.02*
Density −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04







Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 200 200 200 200 200 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50 50 50 50 50
Hansen J statistic
(P-value)
0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
WaldTest for time
dummies
0 0 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.083
Dependent variable: Share of property
(Clustered) Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients
Instrumented: User cost
Instruments: User cost (t-1), Ppop2039, Ppop2039 (t-1), Credit, Credit (t-1), In GDPpc (t-1), Shousing
*** p < 1%
** p < 5%
* p < 10%
Finally, following Table 8, an increase in one point of the “pending-plus-new cases
rate” (per 1,000 inhabitants) would increase the property share by around 0.14–0.18
percentage points (around 3,200–4,100 dwellings in Madrid, 2,900–3,700 in Barce-
lona and 1,300–1,700 in Valencia).
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